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Abstract
In this paper, we study a large sample of 507 privatization offerings from 39
countries over the period 1979-1996. Our objectives are twofold. First, we
document the extent of short-run underpricing of these privatization offerings
and measure their variation across countries, industries, and years, as well as
drawing comparisons to private company IPOs. Second, we test alternative
explanations of the determinants of short-run underpricing drawing on various
models of maximizing behavior by underwriters, augmented by variables that
proxy for national political objectives. Overall, we find support for elements of
asymmetric information theory, investor sentiment theory and the reputation
building hypothesis. With the exception of the Gini coefficient, our political proxy
variables are typically not significant.  Thus to a significant degree, the
investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private
companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of
state-owned-enterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies.
JEL classification: G15, G24
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1. Introduction
Previous empirical research has found that initial public offerings (IPOs)
tend to be underpriced leading to positive initial short-run returns. Until recently,
these studies focused exclusively on the IPOs of privately (or closely) held
enterprises primarily in developed financial markets, and to some degree in
smaller markets.1 Because these IPOs are transactions among private agents,
theories of underpricing relied on some form of market failure, usually related to
asymmetric information.
Since the late 1970s, the transformation of formerly state-owned-
enterprises (SOEs) has provided another important source for IPOs.
Privatization of SOEs was a key element of Margaret Thatcher’s economic
strategy for the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. Since then, privatization has
expanded across other developed countries as well as smaller developing
economies. For the period 1988-1993, Sader (1995) reports 2,655 privatization
transactions (including private sales and public offerings) across 95 countries
that  generated total issue proceeds of US$271 billion. Our own analysis
covering 1970-1996 finds $510 billion raised through public share offerings
                                                       
1 One of the first studies of the U.S. IPO market is Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). Recent studies
incorporating larger sample sizes include Ritter (1991) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994).
See Loughran, et al. (1994) for a study of IPO performance for 15 industrial and 9 developing
countries.
4(excluding private sales). Recently, the OECD (1998) estimated that proceeds
from privatization sales reached $153 billion in 1997 alone, with about $69
billion raised through public offerings.
Very few papers have analyzed the behavior of returns on privatization
IPOs or the determinants of these returns. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) study
109 privatization IPOs (64 from four developed countries and 45 from four
emerging markets). The authors conclude that on average the initial returns of
privatization IPOs and private company IPOs are similar. In addition, the authors
find that privatization initial returns depend significantly on several country,
industry and offer-specific variables. However, as government is part of every
privatization IPO, the authors caution that their evidence is also consistent with
theories that emphasize various political objectives. Jones, et al. (1999) examine
a larger sample of privatizations (630 episodes from 59 countries) and find
evidence of underpricing (on average). For a smaller sub-sample of 93
episodes, the authors report significant variation in underpricing across firms
which they attribute to various political and economic objectives of governments.
In this paper, we study a comparably large sample of 507 privatization
offerings from 39 countries over the period 1979-1996. Our objectives are
twofold. First, we document the extent of short-run underpricing of these
privatization offerings and measure their variation across countries, industries,
and years, as well as drawing comparisons to private company IPOs. Second,
we test alternative explanations of the determinants of short-run underpricing
drawing on various models of maximizing behavior by underwriters.
5The process of privatization involves government officials in the sale of
state-owned assets. Hence, it is natural to suppose that political forces play
some part in the privatization process – from the selection of which assets are
put up for sale, to the selection of the lead manager, and to the pricing discounts
allotted to employees and small domestic investors. Indeed some authors have
made the role of government central to their analysis of privatization.2 And some
empirical studies have uncovered little empirical support for asymmetric
information variables, and instead attribute privatization IPO underpricing to “the
tendency of governments to trade off sales proceeds to achieve share
allocations and control restrictions that reflect political and economic policy
objectives.”3
We do not deny that political thinking influences elements of the
privatization process. Governments have a preference for allotting shares to key
domestic residents and retaining control similar to the preferences of private
owners in a conventional IPO. However, in our view as long as some shares are
offered to the general public, we expect that these shares will be priced in
accordance with the returns available from other conventional IPOs of private
sector firms. Government cannot achieve less underpricing in order to maximize
issue proceeds, because investors will demand underpricing consistent with
levels elsewhere. And government cannot allow consistently greater
underpricing for fear that it will be accused of “giving away the crown jewels.”
While privatization IPOs are a special category of IPO, under competitive
                                                       
2 See Perotti (1995) and Perotti and Guney (1993).
3 Jones, et al. (1999, p. 251).
6conditions they will be priced in a manner consistent with other conventional IPO
opportunities. Thus, we predict that asymmetric information variables should
also be significantly related to privatization IPO underpricing.
Overall, our empirical results offer support for explanations of privatization
underpricing related to asymmetric information, investor sentiment theory and
the reputation building hypothesis. With the exception of the Gini coefficient, our
variables that proxy political objectives are typically not significant, or are made
insignificant by the inclusion of other variables. Thus to a significant degree, the
investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private
companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of
state-owned-enterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by
presenting an overview of the privatization process, drawing attention to those
factors that distinguish an IPO for a state-owned-enterprise from an IPO for a
private company. In section 3, we review the theoretical literature on
underpricing in IPOs and highlight the most relevant empirical evidence. We
describe our data and methodology in section 4. And we present our empirical
results on the variation in IPO returns and their determinants in section 5.
Concluding comments and comparisons with other studies are in the final
section.
72. An Overview of Privatization
a. Economic and Political Forces
Privatization is the modern word used to describe the transfer of the
ownership and control of productive assets from government hands to the
private sector. Various procedures including the outright sale of assets, industry
deregulation, and out-sourcing various government services to private firms all
fall within the scope of privatization. In this paper, we focus only on the sale of
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) to private investors.
The German government’s sale of an 80% stake in automaker
Volkswagen in 1961 marked the first major privatization in the post-World War II
period. But in no way did this deal begin a trend. Industries such as banking,
transportation, petroleum and other resources extraction activities,
telecommunications, heavy manufacturing and, of course, defense-related
industries were deemed a critical part of the national interest in many
democratic, industrial countries. And in communist countries, all important
productive assets (with the exception of agriculture) were government owned.
Over the last 20 years, both economic and political forces have supported
the momentum toward privatization. The basic economic argument (that
government-owned companies are less likely to achieve operating efficiency)
became more critical as firm size, capital requirements, and technology
increased. Governments in countries as distinct as the United Kingdom and
Chile concluded that privatization of state-owned companies was the preferred
strategy for maintaining global competitiveness and building national income. In
81981, the Conservative Government led by Price Minister Margaret Thatcher
started its own privatization program by selling off a majority stake (51.6%) in
state-owned British Aerospace.4
Progress toward European Union provided further incentives for
privatization sales. In the late 1980s as part of its drive toward a “single market,”
the European Union imposed limitations on government subsidies to SOEs that
could lead to unfair competition. And in the 1990s, membership in the European
Monetary Union (EMU) required countries to lower their fiscal budget deficits
and official debt levels. Privatization sales, especially of money losing firms,
helped countries meet their EMU membership criteria.
In emerging markets, the debt crises of the 1980s led to a number of
market-oriented reforms. Many of these countries saw foreign capital inflows as
the engine of growth, and they were willing to relax controls on foreign
ownership in exchange. The break-up of the Soviet Union and freeing of Eastern
European economies led to a wave of privatization as productive assets were
either closed down or restructured and spun off.
The demand side through the development of global capital markets also
played an important role. Assets with the scale of many established national
firms could not be sold efficiently without tapping large pools of capital from
around the world. Institutional innovations such as the global security offering
and the Rule 144a market in the U.S. brought more investors into the market for
privatization IPOs.
                                                       
4 It is often overlooked that the Labor Government had previously sold a 17% stake in British
Petroleum in June 1977 raising £564 million.
9b. Comparing Private Company and Privatization IPOs
While both conventional IPOs (by private owners) and privatization IPOs
(by governments) result in a transfer of share ownership to new owners and
financial wealth to the old owners, there are important differences between the
two transactions.
First, a government (unlike a private seller) may have many goals in mind
other than maximizing the sales price of the current IPO. A government
privatization program may span several years and include dozens or even
hundreds of IPOs. For larger SOEs, the government may sell only a portion of its
stake in the IPO, and follow up with additional seasoned equity issues. As a
result, the government is likely to be a more frequent issuer and with larger size
issues than any private sector firm. By implication, the government may be more
likely to underprice its earlier privatization offerings to build its reputation. Such
a strategy could maximize the net present value of an entire privatization
program, rather than each individual issue in isolation. However, the government
may also have political objectives in mind. Dispersing share ownership of
underpriced IPOs among small investors could be a way to curry favor with
voters. But dispersed ownership could also represent an attempt to capture
positive externalities by establishing a culture of private investing and deepening
local capital markets and raising the value of future offerings.
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Second, an SOE on the verge of privatization is very different from a
traditional private sector firm preparing for an IPO. A new, fledgling private firm
making its IPO would be considered riskier than the average established publicly
held firm. So the systematic risk (or beta coefficient) for a conventional IPO likely
exceeds one. By comparison, a privatization IPO usually involves a firm with
substantial assets and a long operating history. In certain cases (such as
energy, telecommunications, banking, among others), the privatization IPOs may
be in industries that are highly concentrated (in the local market), highly
regulated, or both. Thus, privatization IPOs may be perceived as having lower
cash flow risks.
Despite these differences, we conjecture that privatization IPOs and
conventional private sector IPOs are similar in that the marginal shares from
both are sold into the same market place. While additional factors could bear on
the pricing of privatization IPOs, the same considerations that investors take into
account when pricing conventional IPOs should be at work in the market for
privatization IPOs.
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3. Theory and Empirical Regularities on Initial Public Offerings
The empirical literature on IPOs has established three stylized empirical
regularities. The first, known as the “new issue anomaly,” is that IPOs are on
average substantially underpriced in early market trading. The second regularity
is the existence of “hot issue” (in which average initial returns are unusually
high) and “cold issue” markets (in which the opposite is observed). The third
empirically regularity focuses on long-run returns for IPOs, where it has typically
been found that over a period of several months to several years, the abnormal
returns relative to a benchmark portfolio are usually significantly negative. Our
focus in this paper is on short-run underpricing.
a. International Evidence on Short-run Underpricing
The IPO market in the United States has been examined extensively.
Studies of U.S. IPOs report that average initial returns are near 15% with most
estimates in the 10-20% range. In an early study of 2,650 IPOs in the 1960s,
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) find that average initial returns are 16.83%. In a later
study of 1,526 IPOs in the period 1975-1984, Ritter (1991) reports average initial
returns of 14.32%. In a still larger sample of 10,626 IPOs spanning a longer time
period (1960-1992), Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) report average initial
returns of 15.30%.
In other countries, average initial returns on IPOs of privately held firms
are always positive, but show much greater variability.5 IPO samples in Belgium,
                                                       
5 See Loughran, et al. (1994) for a summary of other studies, and Huang (1997) for a literature
review.
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Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom illustrate similar
or smaller degrees of underpricing compared to U.S. IPO samples. For example,
in a study of 131 French IPOs between 1983 and 1986, Husson and Jacquillat
(1990) report that the average (market-adjusted) initial return is 4.0%
By comparison, studies of IPOs in other industrial countries (Australia,
Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland)
have displayed greater (and sometimes considerably greater) average initial
returns in the range 21.50% to 54.40%. In some cases, however, the results are
noticeably time varying with underpricing in Australia and Germany estimated at
29.20% and 21.50% in early samples, falling to 11.90% and 10.90% respectively
in more recent samples.
In developing economies, average initial returns (for conventional IPOs)
are still more variable and typically greater than for the United States. For the
1979-1983 period, Dawson (1987) reported average initial returns of 13.80% in
Hong Kong and 166.67% in Malaysia. In other countries (Brazil, Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) estimates of short-run underpricing in the 25% to
80% have been reported. Mexico is a lone exception, where in a sample of 44
IPOs from 1987-1990, Aggarwal et al. (1993) estimate initial returns of only
2.80%.
Several explanations are possible for these cross-country differences.
Institutional differences probably play an important role, as underwriters follow
different price setting and distribution strategies across countries, and
governments may impose severe constraints on the price setting or share
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distribution process. For example, South Korea (prior to the June 1988 reform)
and Malaysia (where underpricing was most severe) imposed bindings
constraints on the offer price. Loughran, et al. (1994) argue that in their study,
underpricing is generally greater where the offering price is set prior to obtaining
information about demand. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) confirm that
underpricing is greater the longer the time between setting the offering price and
the initial market trade date.
The “hot issue” (“cold issue”) regularity was documented initially for the
U.S. market by Ibbotson (1975), and reconfirmed by Ritter (1984). Loughran, et
al. (1994) show that a similar correlation between the level of stock prices and
IPO volume is also often found in markets outside of the United States. The
tendency for a high volume of IPOs to follow periods of abnormally high market
returns could reflect a combination of positive feedback trading from investors
and opportunistic behavior by corporate issuers. The general pattern indicates
that issuers or underwriters are able to successfully time their offerings when the
market is optimistic about IPOs in general and when the demand for IPOs is
high, in order to achieve a smooth distribution of shares and raise a large
amount of capital.
b. Alternative Theories of IPO Underpricing
An initial public offering of securities brings together the current owners of
the firm, a financial intermediary (the underwriter), and a set of potential new
shareholders all within a particular institutional framework. Various theories of
14
underpricing have been proposed that focus on one or more of the players in the
IPO process. We summarize the most important theoretical models that attempt
to explain the empirical regularities in the conventional new issue market.6
(1) Principal-Agent Theory and Costly Monitoring
Baron’s (1982) model combines principal-agent theory, asymmetric
information and costly monitoring. Financial intermediaries (underwriters) are
assumed to have superior information (relative to the issuing firm) about pricing
conditions in capital markets. Because the issuing firm (the principal) cannot
perfectly monitor the underwriter’s (agent’s) efforts in marketing the new issue,
the model predicts that underwriters tend to underprice IPOs both to minimize
their selling efforts and to maximize the probabilities of a successful offering.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) present a clever test of Baron’s model
by examining the IPOs of 38 investment banks that went public from 1970 to
1987. There should be neither information asymmetries not principal-agent
problems in this sample. So Baron’s model would predict that underpricing
should be less severer than in other IPOs. Yet Muscarella and Vetsuypens find
significant underpricing comparable to other IPOs of similar size, and even a
higher degree of underpricing in many cases where issuers act as their own led
manager. These results are not consistent with the prediction of Baron’s model.
                                                       
6 An additional theory proposed by Tinic (1988) is that underpricing represents a form of
insurance against legal liability for the issuer in the event that the firm does not perform well.
Clearly the legal liability of issuers differs from country to country. And the legal liability
hypothesis has been questioned even for the U.S. markets. See Drake and Vetsuypens (1993).
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(2) Asymmetric Information and the Winner’s Curse Hypothesis
Rock’s (1986) model relies on another information asymmetry, that
between informed and uninformed investors. The model posits that informed
investors subscribe to IPOs only when they expect a positive initial return, while
uninformed investors subscribe to every IPO. If underpriced, IPOs would be
oversubscribed by informed investors, resulting in rationing of shares to
uniformed investors. If overpriced, IPOs would be sold exclusively to uninformed
investors who would earn negative initial returns (thus, the so-called “winner’s
curse”). Because issuers must continue to attract uninformed as well as informed
investors, new issues must be underpriced (on average) to provide uninformed
investors with acceptable rates of return. Rock’s model thus predicts that
underpricing is an equilibrium and ongoing phenomenon. Extensions of the
model predict that expected underpricing is greater the greater is the ex ante
uncertainty about the value of a new issue.7
Empirical evidence (Koh and Walter, 1989 and Michaely and Shaw, 1993)
generally confirms the major implications and predictions of Rock’s model. In the
case of privatization sales, it can be argued that SOEs are usually large, well-
known firms and governments make genuine efforts to provide the general public
with information prior to the public offering. While these efforts might result in
information asymmetry for privatization IPOs that is no greater than (and
possibly less than) for conventional IPOs. On the other hand, privatization IPOs
may harbor additional uncertainties related to the governments commitment to
the privatization process, it commitment to market-based reforms, and the ability
16
of the new managers to make the transition to a competitive market system.
Governments, as partial owners after an IPO, may still exercise some control
over the day-to-day operation of the firm, and act to reach political goals rather
than act for the benefit of shareholders. Moreover, the scale of many
privatization sales may pose an additional risk (for underwriters with scarce
capital) that provides an additional incentive for underpricing.
(3) Reputation Building Hypothesis
Because underpricing is costly to the issuing firm, firms have an incentive
to reveal their low-risk character to the market. Carter and Manaster (1990)
theorize that one way for firm to signal their quality is by selecting underwriters
with high prestige. The authors offer empirical evidence that underwriter prestige
is positively associated with the marketing of low risk IPOs.
The notion of reputation building might also apply to firms or governments
that make repeated public offerings of securities. In this context, it is in the
interest of those firms and governments to gain a reputation as a good issuer.
This theme summarizes the signaling hypothesis, which we discuss next.
(4) Signaling Theory
Signaling theory applies to an issuer who intends to sell shares through
an initial public offering and subsequent (seasoned) public offerings. Given the
existence of both good and bad firms and asymmetric information, investors will
value a signal that the IPO is from a good firm. A good firm can afford to signal
                                                                                                                                                                    
7 See Beatty and Ritter (1986).
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by underpricing its IPO, because only good firms can be expected to recoup
their initial loss after their true performance is realized. By bearing a large initial
cost, good firms can credibly signal their type. Bad firms run the risk that their
true type will be realized, and so they cannot afford to signal.
Signaling theory relates directly to the discussion of privatization IPOs.
The selling government is a large issuer who is likely to return to the IPO market
more often than any individual firm. A privatization program sets the government
on course to sell dozens and possibly hundreds of public assets in a sequence.
Given the scale of some SOEs, the government may begin with an IPO for a
partial stake in the firm, followed by one or more seasoned offering for the
remainder.8
The signaling hypothesis predicts that a selling government should use
underpricing of the initial public offering, along with a partial/gradual sales
strategy to send a credible signal to the market and maximize the gross
proceeds from its overall privatization program. Earlier studies (Jenkinson and
Mayer, 1988) find that seasoned issues in the British privatization program
experience less underpricing than the IPOs.
(5) Investor Sentiment Theories
The theories reviewed so far focus on the IPO price, and appeal to
rational or equilibrium models to generate underpricing. The investor sentiment
                                                       
8 The government may retain a special share (or “golden share”) granting it various rights and
restrictions such as the citizenship of the CEO, limitations on foreign share ownership,
restrictions on asset disposals, and so forth. These conditions may continue even after the
government has fully disposed of all ordinary shares.
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approach focuses instead on after-market pricing, and argues that irrational
investor over-optimism may drive up the prices for IPOs resulting in the
underpricing that is so well documented in the literature. When investor demand
for IPOs is subject to “fads” rather than on valuation based on fundamentals,
investor sentiment leads to initial underpricing.9 Investor sentiment links easily to
the cycle of “hot” and “cold” IPO markets. And, as well, if the initial underpricing
effect is based on initial over optimism, this helps to reconcile the long-run
underperformance of IPOs.
                                                       
9 The investor sentiment story can be fleshed out further by considering the impact of noise
traders and other uninformed investors in the context of risks that limit arbitrage and pricing to
fundamentals. See Shleifer and Summers (1990).
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4. Data Sources, Empirical Methodology and Hypotheses
a. The Sample Data
The data on privatization transactions were assembled from several
sources. Our primary sources were the Privatization Yearbook 1994 and Sader
(1995). These sources were augmented by various business magazines and
newspapers including the Wall Street Journal Index, 1990-95 Annual; Financial
Times, Euromoney, Investment Dealer’s Digest and the Securities Data
Corporation new issue database. In addition, descriptive data were obtained
from the Privatization Database maintained by Privatisation International Ltd.
These sources were supplemented by information from government privatization
agencies, stock exchanges, and requests made directly to individual firms. Our
source for aftermarket trading prices of IPO shares and local stock market
returns (adjusted for dividends and splits) is Datastream.
This search produced a sample of 507 new offerings made by 387
privatized firms from 39 countries from 1979 to 1996.10 Summary information
about the sample is reported in Table 1. The sample consists of 330 initial public
offerings (IPOs) and 177 seasoned public offerings which raised total proceeds
of $352 billion.11
Our sample is broadly similar to the sample analyzed by Jones, et al.
(1999) who also used Privatisation International as their primary source. The
Jones, et al. sample contains 630 firms, and includes a large number of Chinese
                                                       
10 A complete list of all firms in the sample is in Appendix A of Huang (1997) or available from
the authors.
11 The offerings should be classified as secondary (rather than primary) since in most cases the
governments sold existing shares rather than capital-raising shares.
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IPOs along with several other countries we chose to exclude. In the case of
China, we concluded that the Chinese market is in a more primitive stage than
other emerging markets, making it more subject to manipulation, insider trading,
and so forth – and deserving of a separate rigorous study.12
Across  our entire sample, the average offering size was $717 million
while the median was $163 million, indicating a distribution skewed to the right
by some very large deals. The largest issues in our sample are the three
consecutive NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) issues of 1987 and 1988
which raised $15.5, $40.3 and $22.8 billion respectively. Overall, 79 deals (about
one-sixth of our sample) each raised in excess of $1 billion. The mean and
median values in our sample are much greater than those for conventional IPOs
outside the United States. For a sample of 21 countries, Loughran et al. (1994)
report that mean issue proceeds range from $6 million in Brazil to $109 million in
Italy. Clearly privatization IPOs are far larger than the typical conventional
offerings outside the United States.
For those 297 IPO cases reporting data, governments sold an average
stake of 47.3%. In 44 of those cases, the government sold a 100% stake.
Seasoned offerings tended to be larger deals (in terms of mean and median
proceeds) but represent a smaller percentage stake, only 25.1% on average.
The implication of this result is that governments tend to sell larger companies
off in a series of tranches, while larger stakes are initially offered in smaller
companies.
                                                       
12 Indeed, a recent study by Su and Fleisher (1999) finds that the mean initial return on 308
Chinese IPOs from 1987 to 1996 was 948.6%.
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Our sample includes 57 privatization offerings in the United Kingdom and
255 from all of Western Europe. Issue proceeds in these transactions were
considerably larger, and governments sold larger percentage stakes, than in the
complementary non-U.K. or non-Western European samples. Based on 191
cases, roughly 39% of all offerings were allocated to foreigners. By comparison,
the foreign allocation in the United Kingdom, where capital markets are well
developed, was only 23.5%. In a sample of non-OECD countries, the foreign
allocation was 46.6%, reflecting a far greater reliance on foreign investors. We
find this even though non-OECD deals tend to be much smaller, with a median
offering size of $49 million versus $379 million in OECD countries.
Nearly half of our sample reflects transactions in non-Western European
countries. A complete list of offerings and issue proceeds by country is in Table
2.
The industry patterns for our sample are detailed in Table 3. The median
offering size in infrastructure industries is $488 million, or at least twice what we
observe in financial services or primary sector firms, and ten times or more
greater than offerings in industrial manufacturing and other industries.
Infrastructure itself appears to be dominated by offerings from
telecommunications and utilities, where the median offering size in our sample is
$932 million and $700 million respectively.
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b. Empirical Methodology
To analyze the short-run underpricing effect, we compute the initial return.
For an IPO, the initial return on stock i  is defined as the percentage return from
the offering price to the first market price available:
where Pi1 is the first market price of stock i and Pi0 is the official offer price. In
most cases, we are able to determine the exact listing date of the IPO and the
closing price at the end of the first trading day is used for Pi1. The initial return is
not adjusted for overall market movements.
The initial return is the sole dependent variable in our study and our
measurement of it deserves further elaboration. Pi0 is the offer price that an
investor without any preferential treatment would pay. This is usually the offer
price available to institutional investors and foreign investors. Because certain
retail investors and employees are sometimes offered shares at a discount or on
special financing terms, our returns in equation (1) are a conservative estimate.
The primary source for offer price data and the first trading day price was
Privatisation International. Datastream was used to cross-check against first
trading day prices and to supplement a small number of missing prices.
For a seasoned offer, the initial return is calculated similarly. We take the
going market price on the announcement day as Pi0 and the first market price
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0
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after the seasoned offer as Pi1. For seasoned offerings, the Privatisation
International database is our primary source for Pi0.
Given the eclectic nature of theories of IPO underpricing, our initial tests
examine the differences across mean initial returns for various sub-samples.
These test comparisons draw mostly on the theories of reputation building,
asymmetric information and investor sentiment.
In order to control for some of the factors that may effect initial returns, we
also propose a multivariate regression model. The dependent variable is the
actual initial return (ri0) as a proxy for the expected degree of underpricing. The
explanatory variables that we associate with conventional IPO offerings include
the volatility of the stock's aftermarket prices (as a risk measure), the volatility of
the market index prior to the offering (as another risk indicator), the stock market
trend in the month prior to offering (as an investor sentiment indicator), the issue
size of the offering, an OECD dummy variable, and six industry sector dummies,
In our regressions, we augment these variables with a set of variables
designed to proxy for national political objectives. These variables include a
dummy variable for the sale of a controlling interest (greater than 50%), the
national budget deficit as a percent of GDP, the percentage of shares sold to
employees, the Gini coefficient of income inequality, and the percentage
allocation to foreign investors. Privatisation International is our primary source
for the allocation data, shares to employees and to foreigners. Annual data on
the national budget deficit and GDP are from International Financial Statistics. A
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time series of Gini coefficients is available through the World Bank.13 These
variables are summarized in Tables A1 and A2.
As we discuss in the next section, the empirical regression results shed
light on the role played by reputation building, asymmetric information and
investor sentiment theories for pricing privatization offerings, as well as the role
of political objectives.
                                                       
13 See World Bank, 1998, Deininger and Squire Data Set, accessible at internet website
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/dddeisqu.htm
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5. Empirical Results
a. Hypotheses Based on a Comparison of Mean Initial Returns
Based on our sample of 507 privatization transactions, we were able to
compute initial returns on 297 issues as shown In Table 4. Across all 297 issues,
the mean initial return was 25.6% while the median was 10.0%, suggesting that
the distribution of initial returns is skewed to the right.
IPOs versus Seasoned Offerings
Both the reputation building and asymmetric information theories are
relevant for comparing returns on IPOs versus seasoned offerings. The
reputation building hypothesis postulates that the issuer (in our case, the
government) builds credibility by following a carefully designed privatization
plan. The plan may involve a series of stages, including partial privatization in an
early stage, as a way for the government to signal the investment community. In
the reputation building scenario, the government makes a commitment to its
privatization policy. Shareholders benefit from underpricing in the early stages,
so that later offerings (both of seasoned offerings of already partially-privatized
firms and new IPOs) are more enthusiastically received. If the reputation building
hypothesis is correct, IPOs will on average be more underpriced that seasoned
offerings.
However, asymmetric information theory also predicts that the expected
underpricing of high-risk offerings should be greater than for lower risk offerings.
For IPOs, the relevant measure of uncertainty is not systematic, beta-type risk
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but rather the gross uncertainty regarding the aftermarket price. Because there
is no prior trading history for stocks of privatized firm, uncertainty (and therefore
underpricing) should be greater for a privatization IPO than for a seasoned
offering.
To test for these effects, we split the sample between IPOs and seasoned
offerings. For 220 IPOs we estimate a mean initial return of 32.1% and for 77
seasoned offerings a mean initial return on 7.17%. Using a two-sample t-test
that allows for unequal sample sizes and sample variances, we find that the
initial return on IPOs is significantly higher than on seasoned offerings at the 1%
level.14 Table 4 also reports mean initial returns for all issues, returns for IPOs
only, and returns for seasoned offerings broken down by geographic region.
Except for Canada, we observe a similar finding with the initial returns on IPOs
greater than for seasoned offerings. Where sample sizes permit, a t-test
confirms that these differences are significant. These findings lend support to
both the reputation building and asymmetric information theories.
Privatization IPOs versus Conventional IPOs
Because both asymmetric information and reputation building theories
predict  that IPOs should be more underpriced than seasoned offerings, we
propose an additional test to distinguish the relevance of these two theories. As
most SOEs are large and well-established firms, sometimes with dominant
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market positions, it is reasonable to assume that they reflect less market (beta)
risk than for the typical conventional IPO of a recently chartered private sector
firm. Therefore, asymmetric information theory predicts less underpricing in
privatization IPOs (ceteris paribus) than for conventional IPOs.
On the other hand, the owners of a SOE (i.e. the government) may use
underpricing to build their reputation for later stages of their privatization
program, or to achieve other political goals (such as wider share ownership).
Therefore, the reputation building hypothesis predicts greater underpricing in
privatization IPOs (ceteris paribus) than for conventional IPOs.
For those countries with three or more privatization IPOs and a prior study
of the returns to conventional IPOs, we compare the returns on privatization and
conventional IPOs.15 Some studies of conventional IPOs report only the mean
initial return and not the variance, and so we are limited to calculating a simple t-
test as in Table 5 Panel A.16 Other studies also report the variance of initial
returns, which allows us to compute a two-sample t-test as in Table 5 Panel B.
The results are mixed. For the United Kingdom, France and Singapore,
mean initial returns for privatization IPOs are greater than for conventional IPOs.
In the United Kingdom and France, privatization IPOs have outperformed
conventional IPOs by about 5-6 percentage points, and in Singapore the
difference has been more than 11 percentage points. The results are highly
                                                       
15 We lack data on conventional IPOs to make comparisons with our results on privatization
IPOs for Austria (9 firms with IPO returns), Turkey (21), Argentina (5), Hungary (4) and Poland
(24).
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significant for the U.K. and less so for France and Singapore. However, for the
five other countries in Table 5 (Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, and
Malaysia), the results are reversed with greater mean initial returns for
conventional IPOs compared with privatization IPOs. The differences in returns
for Germany, Italy and Canada are significantly negative. These results do not
permit us to distinguish clearly between the asymmetric information and
reputation building hypotheses.
Developed Countries versus Developing Countries
In countries with well-developed capital markets there are often
more professional security analysts and more efficient information dissemination
mechanisms. This suggests that information asymmetry would be less severe in
these countries and uncertainty regarding the intrinsic value of a privatized firm
lower. Previous research has found that mean initial returns are lower in
countries with well-developed capital markets. Our own results (Table 4),
showed that initial returns can vary considerably across geographic regions.
We divide our sample countries between OECD and non-OECD countries
and test the difference in initial returns using a formal two-sample t-test. Our
results are in Table 6. Initial returns for 100 privatization offerings in non-OECD
countries average 58.1%  compared to only 9.4% for 198 privatization offerings
in OECD countries. If we restrict the sample to only IPOs, the comparison is now
65.9% initial returns in non-OECD countries versus 11.1% initial returns in
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OECD countries. These differences are highly significant and provide strong
evidence favoring the asymmetric information theory.
Early versus Later Privatization IPOs
The reputation building hypothesis predicts that the average underpricing
for early privatization IPOs should be greater than for privatization IPOs that are
scheduled later. This prediction assumes that to enhance the success of a
privatization program, the government may deliberately underprice IPOs to
attract both institutional and retail investors. Reputation is enhanced by greater
underpricing in early IPOs than in later IPOs.
Our sample permits us to investigate the pattern of returns over time
within countries. For those countries with four or more IPOs, we compare the
mean of early IPOs (defined as the first Ni/2) with later IPOs. The results in
Table 7 show no systematic and significant pattern. For Poland, early initial
returns average 210.0% and are far greater than later initial returns (54.0%), but
the difference is not significant. The results are reversed for Malaysia where
later initial returns reach 81.9% and exceed early initial returns by 16.5%.
Pooling the results across countries produces a sample of 218 IPOs. In this
sample, early IPO returns average 39.4% beating out later IPO returns of only
24.5%, but the difference is not significant. These broad results are consistent
with a theory of reputation building, but the results do not show a consistent and
significant pattern.
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We also investigated the pattern of IPO initial returns aggregated across
countries on a year-by-year basis. These results are shown in Table 8. Both
1987 and 1993 stand out as years with high mean and median returns relative to
our sample. And correspondingly, 1988 and 1995 stand out as years with low
mean and median returns. We reject that mean initial returns are identical
across years. The smaller underpricing of IPOs in 1988 and 1995 (relative to the
sample mean) is significant at the 95% level. In this sense, we can label 1988
and 1995 as “cold issue” years for privatization IPOs.
b. Hypotheses Based on Regression Analysis of Mean Initial Returns
We estimated multiple regressions using various combinations of the
variables in Tables A1 and A2 to examine their marginal impact on initial returns
conditional on other variables. Based on the various theories we have
discussed, the expected signs of the coefficients are as follows:
b1 > 0: When aftermarket standard deviation of returns is an adequate
proxy for ex ante uncertainty, asymmetric information theory
predicts a positive relationship between risk and initial returns.
b2 > 0 Investor sentiment theory predicts that initial returns are higher
when the stock market has recently shown an upward trend.
b3 < 0 Investor sentiment theory predicts that initial returns are lower
when the stock market has recently shown greater volatility.
b4 < 0 According to asymmetric information theory, it is reasonable to
31
expect that there should be less uncertainty about larger firms, as
they are likely to be followed by more analysts, produce more
information about their activities, and possibly have longer periods
of operation. On the other hand, many privatizations occur in
smaller capital markets with less promise for placing larger deals. If
capacity is limited, larger issues will require greater underpricing to
be placed. This “capital market capacity” hypothesis predicts that a
higher degree of underpricing is required for a larger privatization
offering, so that the coefficient b3 is positive (b4 > 0).
b5 < 0 The asymmetric information theory predicts less underpricing in
markets with more professional security analysts and information
dissemination.
bj > 0 The asymmetric information theory predicts that initial returns
should be higher for those industries (j = 6,11) that are more
susceptible to greater risk through government regulation.
c1 > 0 The asymmetric information theory predicts that initial returns
should be higher for those cases where the government retains
voting control over the firm.
c2 > 0 Government budget deficits can be an indicator of government size
and public mismanagement, leading to greater initial returns.
c3 > 0 Political theories of privatization suggest that underpricing is
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greater as more shares are allocated to company employees.
c4 > 0 Political theories suggest that underpricing is greater when income
inequality is greater and government uses privatization to transfer
wealth to the general public.
c5 < 0 Reputation building predicts that underpricing is a tool that the
government can use to build public support for a privatization
program, underpricing also represents a wealth transfer from the
state to shareholders. For a given level of underpricing,
governments will be more subject to criticism the greater is the
foreign allocation. Initial returns should be lower as foreign the
allocation rises.
Along with the data we have used to this point, to estimate a multiple
regression equation, we also require one month or two months of aftermarket
stock prices to estimate the risk of the security. This requirement reduces our
effective sample size. Our results are shown in Table 9, Panels A and B.
Regressions 1-5 report the results for various combinations of our
conventional dependent variables.  In each of these equations, the coefficient of
lagged market returns is positive (b2>0) and significant, indicating that
underpricing of privatization IPOs is greater when the market has been rising.
The coefficient of lagged market volatility is negative (b3<0) and significant,
indicating that underpricing is smaller when the market has been more volatile in
the month before the IPO. The coefficient of the size variable is negative (b4 < 0)
and significant in specification 1, but not significant, or only marginally so, in
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specifications 2, 3, and 4 when the OECD dummy is included. The coefficient of
the OECD dummy is negative and significant in specifications 2, 3 and 4 (b5<0)
which supports the asymmetric information theory and suggests that privatization
IPOs from OECD countries are (other things equal) less overpriced than for non-
OECD countries. The margin of difference (about 0.50% less underpricing) is
statistically significant, but economically small.
 The coefficient on the stock's subsequent volatility is not significant in
any of the specifications. This result is unchanged when we use volatility
calculated over the subsequent two-month period. The industry dummy variables
introduced in specification 5 are all positive and significant but add little in terms
of R2 over specification 4.17 In subsequent specifications we omit these industry
dummies. Overall, the R2 for specifications 1-5 is about 0.35-0.40 which shows
that the conventional variables explain a significant portion of variability in initial
underpricing.
In Table 9, Panel B, we consider the role of variables intended to proxy
possible political objectives of governments in privatization IPOs. Because data
on these additional variables is not available for all observations in our sample,
the sample size declines with each additional specification. In regression 6, we
include the government budget deficit and Gini coefficient as explanatory
variables. The government budget deficit variable is not significant but the Gini
coefficient variable is positive and significant (c3 > 0), indicating that
underpricing is greater in countries with greater income inequality. However, the
                                                       
17 We test and cannot reject the hypothesis that mean initial returns are equal industry sectors.
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significance of the Gini coefficient disappears when we restore the OECD
variable in specification 7.
In specification 8, we consider the impact of a control dummy (CD) for
cases where more than 50% of the firm is sold. The control dummy coefficient is
positive (c4 > 0) as expected but only significant at the 15% level. In specification
9, we include the percentage allocation to employees and foreigners. This
reduces the sample size substantially to N=63. Neither of these share allocation
variables is significant, but the constant term and four conventional variables
remain significant. The R2 jumps to 73%. In specification 10, we include the
government deficit and Gini coefficient variables. The Gini coefficient is positive
and significant (c3 > 0) as expected and as in specification 6.
Specification 11 includes all the conventional and political proxy
variables. The sample size is N=55. The previous 1-month market trend, 1-
month market volatility, and OECD dummy variables are significant at the 99%
level, as is the Gini coefficient variable. The overall regression is highly
significant with an R2 = 78%. For the sake of comparison, we ran specification
12 that includes only political proxy variables. The sample size is 55 as in
regression 11. Both the government budget deficit and employee allocation
variables have the correct sign, but only the budget deficit coefficient is
significant. The R2 for regression 12 is 36%. Taken together, regressions 11 and
12 show that political variables play a role in explaining privatization IPO
underpricing, but when conventional variables are added, these variables pick
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up most of the explanatory power leaving a much smaller role for the political
variables.
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6. Conclusions
Over the last 20 years, privatization has become an important means for
transferring ownership from government hands into the hands of private owners.
While privatization sales have many things in common with conventional initial
public offerings of privately-held companies, there are differences with respect to
the objectives of the government owners, in the age, size, and riskiness of the
companies, and in the securities markets where the IPO shares are likely to be
sold and traded. These differences suggest that the underpricing of privatization
IPOs could be more severe than for conventional IPOs. Moreover, these
differences could suggest that a new theory that puts greater emphasis on
political objectives is needed to explain the pattern of initial returns on
privatization IPOs.
In this paper, we have argued that as long as shares are offered to the
general public, traditional theories – of asymmetric information, reputation
building, and investor sentiment – that are used to model the behavior of
conventional IPOs should also be relevant for privatization IPOs. We presented
evidence on a large sample of recent privatization IPOs. We compared the
underpricing of these IPOs to underpricing in conventional IPOs. And we
presented univariate tests of differences in means across sub-samples of IPOs
and the results of multivariate regression analysis.
Overall, our results provide much support for elements of the traditional
theories of asymmetric information, reputation building, and investor sentiment.
Consistent with these theories, we find that initial returns on privatization IPOs
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are significantly less than on seasoned offerings. And we find that underpricing
is less  for privatizations in OECD countries, and other sub-samples of more
developed countries. We find evidence for “cold issue” markets for privatizations
after the 1987 stock market crash and 1994 Mexican financial crisis. Our
regression analysis confirms that recent market performance, recent market
volatility,  future stock price volatility and privatizations originating in OECD
countries are significant determinants of underpricing. We find no consistent
evidence that the underpricing of privatization IPOs differs from conventional
IPOs.
We examined the impact of including several variables that proxy for the
political objectives of a government engaged in privatization. Variables reflecting
the allocation of shares to foreigners, to employees, the government budget
deficit, and a control dummy did not help to explain underpricing. The Gini
coefficient was generally significant indicating that where income inequality is
greater, underpricing is greater.
Both caution and good sense should be exercised in interpreting our
results. Clearly, governments are in the business of reaching "political"
objectives and privatization sales could be an important tool in that respect.
Nevertheless, privatization sales are offered into a competitive marketplace, and
are likely to be compared with conventional IPOs and other investment
opportunities. Both political and conventional variables could play a role in
explaining IPO underpricing. And, our classification of these variables as
"political" or "conventional" is not unambiguous.
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Despite these caveats, our results show that the traditional theories of
IPO underpricing help explain many of the patterns we observe in pricing
privatization IPOs. Thus to a significant degree, the investment banking
strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private companies in industrial
countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of state-owned-enterprises
in both industrial and lesser developed economies.
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Table A1. Conventional Market Variables
Variable Description Coefficient
si
Standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns for
stock i over the first one or two months (22 trading
days, or 44 trading days)
b1
RI
Return on the appropriate national market index over
one event month prior to the first trading day of stock I
b2
si,RM
Standard deviation of daily market returns for stock i
over one event month prior to the first trading day of
stock i (22 trading days)
b3
SIZEI
Measure of issue size defined as the natural log of the
issue size in US dollars.
b4
OECDi OECD dummy variable, equal to one if offering i is from
an OECD country, zero otherwise
b5
INDi,j An industry sector dummy variable if the offering i is by
a firm in industry j, i= 1, …  6
b6, b7, b8, b9,
b10, b11
Table A2.  Political Variables
Variable Description Coefficient
CDI Control Dummy = 1 if allocation sold > 50%, zero
otherwise
c1
Bi National government budget deficit as % of GDP c2
EMPLi Percentage of shares allocated to employees c3
GINIi Gini coefficient of income inequality c4
FORGi The percentage allocation of shares to foreigners c5
Table 1
Summary Information:
Entire Privatization Sample and Sub-Samples
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
Total Issue Proceeds Stake Sold Over-subscription Offer Offer
No. in US dollars (million) by Government Ratio Allocated Abroad for Employees
Regions of # of # of Mean # of # of # of
Offers Obs. Total Mean Median Obs. (%) Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Sample 507 491 352,291    717      163      441 39.9% 236 12.3 191 39.1% 233 9.8%
   Panel A: Breakdown between IPOs and Seasoned Offerings
IPOs 330 321 187,097    583      128      294 47.3% 169 15.1 120 33.3% 190 9.5%
Seasoned Offerings 177 170 165,194    972      213      147 25.1% 67 5.2 71 48.8% 43 11.3%
   Panel B: Breakdown between UK and the Rest of the World
UK 57 56 88,878      1,587   909      57 74.7% 53 7.7 38 23.5% 42 4.7%
Total Non-UK 450 435 263,413    606      133      384 34.7% 183 13.7 153 43.0% 191 11.0%
   Panel C: Breakdown between Western Europe and All Other Regions
Western Europe 255 244 199,806    819      379      222 45.0% 133 5.5 126 36.9% 116 8.0%
Total Non-W. Europe 252 247 152,485    617      70        219 34.7% 103 21.1 65 43.4% 117 11.7%
   Panel D: Breakdown between OECD and Non-OECD Countries *
OECD Countries 298 286 311,299    1,088   379      261      44.9% 145 5.9 139 36.0% 130 8.0%
Non-OECD 205 201 40,338      201      49        177      32.4% 89 23.0 51 46.6% 101 12.2%
* This breakdown excludes 4 issues from Mexico (which joined the OECD in 1994) and Hungary, Poland and South Korea (which joined in 1996). 
Table 2
Number of Offerings and Privatization Proceeds by Country
Total Number of Total
Number Offerings Issue Proceeds
Country of with Issue in US dollars
Regions Number Country Offerings Proceeds (million)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Sample 507 491 352,291
Western 1 Austria 22 22 4,080
Europe 2 Denmark 5 4 3,748
3 Finland 13 12 2,367
4 France 37 37 40,865
5 Germany 13 10 6,091
6 Greece 2 2 559
7 Ireland 6 6 1,132
8 Italy 17 17 16,825
9 Netherlands 8 7 10,914
10 Norway 7 7 1,503
11 Portugal 27 27 7,030
12 Spain 13 10 10,654
13 Sweden 5 5 3,912
14 Turkey 23 22 1,248
15 UK 57 56 88,878
North 
America 16 Canada 23 23 8,926
AustralAsia 17 Australia 9 9 5,019
18 New Zealand 3 3 1,076
Asia 19 Indonesia 3 3 2,874
20 Japan 7 7 96,473
21 Malaysia 13 13 3,771
22 Pakistan 2 2 1,079
23 Philippines 5 5 764
24 Singapore 27 26 5,429
25 South Korea 5 4 2,465
26 Taiwan 16 16 4,343
27 Thailand 8 7 1,055
Mid East & 28 Egypt 18 18 392
North Africa 29 Israel 18 18 2,183
30 Morocco 8 8 337
Central & 31 Argentina 9 8 6,160
Latin 32 Brazil 8 8 954
America 33 Colombia 2 2 670
34 Mexico 5 4 4,935
35 Peru 8 8 107
Africa 36 Ghana 3 3 435
37 South Africa 2 2 1,301
Eastern 38 Hungary 14 14 646
Europe 39 Poland 36 36 823
Table 3
Number of Offerings and Privatization Proceeds by Industry Sector and by Industry
Number Issue Proceeds
Industry of in US dollars (million)
Sector Industry Offerings Total Mean Median Maximum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Sample 491 352,291 717 163 40,260
Panel A: By Industry Sector
1. Infrastructure 146 216,499        1,483            488               40,260          
2. Financial Services 106 49,600          468               204               4,810            
3. Primary Sector 61 45,111          740               244               8,857            
4. Industrial Manufacturing 148 38,416          260               49                 3,400            
5. Others 30 2,665            89                 34                 504               
Panel B: By Industry
Infra-
structure 1 Telecommunication 39 138,449        3,550            932               40,260          
2 Airlines 19 11,852          624               205               5,170            
3
Railroad, Road Transport, 
ports, Shipping, 
Aerospace 38 18,337          483               57                 7,300            
4 Utility 50 47,861          957               700               4,500            
Financial 
Services 5 Banking 84 36,657          436               225               4,810            
6 Insurance 22 12,943          588               176               3,000            
Primary 
Sector 7 Mining 8 1,817            227               170               524               
8 Oil & Petroleum 53 43,294          817               282               8,857            
Industrial 
Manu-
facturing 9 General Manufacturing 52 16,082          309               26                 3,400            
10 Steel, Metal 40 14,837          371               151               2,904            
11 Chemical, Pharmaceutical 30 6,191            206               46                 1,285            
12 Construction, Cement 26 1,306            50                 24                 228               
Others 13
Media, Radio, 
Advertising 3 590               197               207               208               
14 Others 27 2,075            77                 29                 504               
Table 4
Initial Returns (Underpricing Effect)
Across Types of Offers and Across Geographic Regions
Initial Returns
Total Initial Returns For IPOs for Seasoned
No. for All Offers Only Offers Only Two-Sample Significance
Regions of No. No. No. t-statistic Level
Offers of Obs. Mean Median Maximum of Obs. Mean of Obs. Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Sample 507 298 25.7% 10.0% 1250.0% 221 32.2% 77 7.17% 3.7021         99%
Panel A: Breakdown between UK and the Rest of the World
UK 57 51 15.7% 17.4% 34.1% 41 17.7% 10 7.0% 3.9693         99%
Total Non-UK 450 202 27.8% 8.4% 1250.0% 145 35.6% 57 7.2% 3.0793         95%
Panel B: Breakdown between Western Europe and All Other Regions
Western Europe 255 169 9.3% 7.7% 40.6% 114 11.2% 55 5.5% 4.3692         99%
Total Non-W. Europe 252 129 47.2% 21.1% 1250.0% 107 54.5% 22 11.4% 3.1284         99%
Panel C: Breakdown Among Geographical Regions
Western Europe 255 169 9.3% 7.7% 40.6% 114 11.2% 55 5.5%
North America (Canada) 23 13 3.5% 1.7% 24.0% 8 1.6% 5 6.6%
AustralAsia 12 12 11.7% 13.8% 25.9% 11 12.0% 1 8.0%
Asia 85 59 41.5% 33.5% 171.0% 53 44.2% 6 17.3% 3.2502         99%
Mid East & North Africa 44 4 7.0% 1 3 9.3%
Central & Latin America 32 8 4.9% 2.3% 20.0% 5 8.8% 3 -1.7%
Eastern Europe 50 32 105.4% 25.5% 1250.0% 28 117.5% 4 20.9% 1.9431         90%
Table 5
Test of Differences in Initial Returns:
Privatization IPOs and Conventional IPOs
Average Panel A Panel B
Initial Return Average Average Average Average
of Our Initial Return of Difference Initial Return of Difference
 Privatization IPOs Conventional IPOs  of Initial Conventional IPOs  of Initial
Country No. No. Returns No. Returns
of Obs. Mean of Obs. Mean (t-stat) of Obs. Mean (2-sampel t-stat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (2) - (4) (6) (7) (8) = (2) - (7)
U.K. 42 17.7% 2,133 12.0% a 5.7% 184 11.5% d 6.2%
(4.2024) * (3.0360) *
France 14 9.5% 187 4.2% a 5.3% 131 4.0% e 5.5%
(1.9129) *** (1.6399) ***
Germany 5 6.3% 170 10.9% a -4.6% **
(-2.8757)
Italy 3 6.4% 75 27.1% a -20.7%
(-2.4460) ***
Canada 8 1.6% 258 5.4% a -3.8% 100 9.3% f -7.7%
(-0.8560) (-1.4289) #
Australia 8 10.9% 266 11.9% a -1.0%
(-0.2972)
Malaysia 10 73.6% 224 75.0% b -1.4% 224 75.0% b -1.4%
(-0.1037) (-0.0943)
Singapore 26 43.0% 128 31.4% c 11.6% 128 31.4% c 11.6%
(1.6128) # (1.4167) #
a:  The source is Table 1 in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist's (1994) paper.  They summarized earlier studies.  For 
countries where more than one set of authors are cited, the combined sample sizes have been constructed.  Their 
sources are as follows.  U.K.: Dimson (1979); Levis (1993); the combined sample period is 1959-90.  France: Husson 
and Jacquillat (1990); Leleux and Muzyka (1993); Palliard and Belletante (1992); the combined sample period is 1983-
92.  Germany: Ljungqvist (1993); the sample period is 1978-92.  Italy: Cherubini and Ratti (1992); the sample period is 
1985-91.  Canada: Jog and Riding (1987); Jog and Srivastava (1993); the combined sample period is 1971-92.  
Australia: Lee, Taylor and Walter (1993); the sample period is 1976-89.
b:  The source is Yong's (1995) paper, the sample period is 1990-94.
c:  The source is Lee, Taylor and Walter's (1994) paper, the sample period is 1973-92.
d:  The source is Levis' (1993) paper, the sample period is 1980-88.
e:  The source is Husson and Jacquillat's (1990) paper, the sample period is 1983-86.
f:   The source is Jog and Riding's (1987) paper, the sample period is 1971-83.
*:      Denotes significant at 99%;    **:    Denotes significant at 95%;
***: Denotes significant at 90%;    #:      Denotes significat at 85%.
Table 6
Compare the Underpricing Effect
Between OECD Countries and Non-OECD Countries *
Initial Returns Initial Returns
for All Offers for IPOs Only
OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD
Countries Countries Countries Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 9.1% 57.8% 10.8% 65.2%
Observation 197 98 135 84
Two sample t-test
t-stat -3.3393 -3.2295
p-val 0.0012 0.0018
* This breakdown excludes 4 issues from Mexico (which joined the OECD in 
1994) and Hungary, Poland and South Korea (which joined in 1996). 
Table 7
Tests of Differences in Initial Returns:
Early Privatizations and Later Privatizations
Total Mean Mean Difference Between
No. of of of the Sub-samples
Country IPO initial Early Later Diffe-
Regions Return IPOs IPOs rence t-stat P-val
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Western Austria 9 3.6% 11.6% -8.0%
Europe France 14 10.9% 8.1% 2.8% 0.4878 0.6360
Germany 5 4.0% 9.6% -5.6%
Turkey 21 6.5% 8.0% -1.5% -0.2482 0.8078
UK 42 17.0% 18.4% -1.4% -0.5320 0.5986
North America Canada 8 6.4% 3.2% 3.2%
AustralAsia Australia 8 11.3% 10.5% 0.8%
Asia Malaysia 10 65.4% 81.9% -16.5% -0.5522 0.5988
Philippines 4 27.3% 80.4% -53.1%
Singapore 26 44.0% 42.0% 2.0% 0.1321 0.8963
Thailand 5 6.0% 35.2% -29.2%
Latin America Argentina 5 12.2% 3.8% 8.4%
East Hungary 4 45.1% 9.7% 35.4%
Europe Poland 24 210.0% 54.0% 156.0% 1.4202 0.1816
Total Sample 218 39.4% 24.5% 15.0% 1.1515 0.2516
Note:  P-val in column (6) indicate that the two sample mean differences for each 
country and for the total sample are not statistically significant at any conventional 
level.
Table 8
Initial Returns (Underpricing Effect) by Year
Initial Returns Initial Returns
for All Offers for IPOs
Year No. No.
of Obs. Mean Median of Obs. Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Sample 298 25.7% 10.0% 221 32.2% 14.5%
before1986 28 15.4% 8.5% 19 19.4% 19.0%
1987 15 42.2% 24.0% 15 42.2% 24.0%
1988 8 4.0% 3.4% 7 3.3% 3.1%
1989 28 16.6% 14.8% 20 19.1% 17.1%
1990 33 17.9% 17.5% 30 17.8% 17.5%
1991 35 12.9% 7.6% 31 14.3% 9.2%
1992 28 20.7% 6.6% 18 29.1% 14.8%
1993 39 78.3% 12.0% 25 118.9% 30.5%
1994 49 18.4% 6.8% 33 23.4% 9.1%
1995 22 11.9% 3.3% 18 13.4% 3.3%
Up to Aug. 1996 13 20.5% 8.0% 5 43.6% 19.4%
Explanatory
Variables Coeff. Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Observations # 155 155 155 155 155
Constant b0 0.6629 * 0.5330 * 0.6550 * 0.6455 * ------ a
StdDev b1 -0.5700 -0.7174 0.2241 -0.2943 -0.4806
Market  Trend - 1month b2 0.8922 * 0.9851 * ------ 0.8346 * 0.8644 *
StdDev Mkt - 1 month b3 -9.5012 ** ------ -9.409 * -7.2563 ** -7.0654 **
Size b4 -0.0649 * -0.0132 -0.0188 -0.0226 *** -0.0196
OECD b5 ------ -0.3451 * -0.3393 * -0.3360 * -0.3276 *
Infrastructure-1 
(Regulated) b6 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.6135 *
Infrastructure-2 (non-
Regulated) b7 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.6891 *
Financial b8 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.5672 *
Primary b9 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.6086 *
Industrial b10 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.6197 *
Other sectors b11 ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.7394 *
R-square 0.3735 0.355 0.3431 0.355 0.3935
F-statistic 17.7644 * 20.6411 * 19.5864 * 20.6411 * 9.3415 *
  a: When a dummy variable is assigned to each of five industry sectors, the overall constant is dropped.
  *: denotes significant at 99%;
  **:   denotes significant at 95%;
  ***:     denotes significant at 90%.  # denotes significant at 85%.
Table 9 - Panel A
To Explain The Short-Run Underpricing
Multivariate Regression Model 
Table 9 - Panel B
Multivariate Regression Model 
To Explain The Short-Run Underpricing
Explanatory
Variables Coeff. Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression Regression
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
No. of Observations # 140 140 133 63 57 55 55
Constant b0 -0.0022 0.4565 ** 0.7674 * 0.5616 * 0.0739 0.056 -0.8041 *
StdDev b1 -0.8446 ** -0.37 -0.5167 8.6097 ** 7.1275 7.0748 # ------
Market  Trend - 1month b2 0.9397 * 0.7523 ** 0.6557 * 1.9538 * 1.8706 * 1.8389 * ------
StdDev Mkt - 1 month b3 -12.3062 * -10.2042 * -5.7934 *** -12.8732 ** -14.5823 ** -14.0511 * ------
Size b4 -0.0384 * -0.0157 -0.034 * 0.0053 0.0059 0.0068 ------
OECD b5 ------ -0.3377 * -0.4117 * -0.5038 * -0.4245 * -0.4355 * ------
Infrastructure-1 
(Regulated) b6 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Infrastructure-2 (non-
Regulated) b7 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Financial b8 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Primary b9 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Industrial b10 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Other sectors b11 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
>50% privatized dummy c1 ------ ------ 0.0686 # ------ ------ 0.0213 -0.0005
Govt Deficit c2 0.0053 -0.0071 ------ ------ -0.0062 -0.0076 0.0299 *
Employee % Allocation c3 ------ ------ ------ 0.1389 0.4341 0.5066 1.1007 #
Gini Coefficient c4 0.0158 * 0.0052 ------ ------ 0.013 * 0.0129 * -0.0055
Foreign % Allocation c5 ------ ------ ------ -0.0908 -0.0781 -0.0648 -0.05
R-square 0.2684 0.3814 0.4167 0.7325 0.7766 0.7809 0.3611
F-statistic 8.1308 * 11.6248 * 15.0042 * 21.517 * 18.1516 * 15.6799 * 5.5385 *
Note: In these regressions, we use the relative size variable as an explanatory variable.
  *: denotes significant at 99%;
  **:   denotes significant at 95%;
  ***:     denotes significant at 90%.  # denotes significant at 85%.
